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Justice and Administrative Law. Third Edition. By

WILLIAM

A. ROBSON.

London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1951. Pp. xxxiii, 674. 30s.
The growth of the administrative process in government may be the most
significant development in Anglo-American law since the development of
equity. Although widely expanded, many matters in the field of administrative law are still involved in controversy. In Britain, as in other Anglo-American law countries, administration has flourished (in spite of Dicey's longmaintained contention that there was no place for it under the British constitution). Robson's book deals with one of the main, and most controverted,
questions in the field, namely that as to the adequacy of administrative adjudication as an instrument for the dispensing of justice.
Although the current edition is the third, so that many of the author's
views, expressed therein, are not entirely new, it still seems worth while to
review the book as a whole since it contains the substantially current thought
(too much neglected in this country) of a leading British writer.
First, as to the author's general position: He foresees an almost inevitable
further expansion of the administrative process in government (page 623),
but he is neither antagonistic toward the present broad development nor
fearful of the expansion he sees ahead. The book seems amply to justify such
an attitude as being well within the range of reason, even though the book
does not deal comprehensively with the whole field of administrative law,
even in Britain.
An important common element in Anglo-American administrative law is
the large amount of adjudicative (sometimes more narrowly called "judicial")
power vested in administrative agencies. The "administrative tribunal" shares
with the courts a large if not the major part of the governmental adjudicative
function; so much so that we have two great "judiciaries"-and not merely
the one consisting of the traditional courts. Robson gives only incidental
attention to the very different matter of delegation of legislative power to
administrative bodies. His main concern is with the adjudicative powers of
administrators for it is in connection with the exercise of this latter power
that he finds the problem of justice. (As respects legislative justice, under
the British system of Parliamentary supremacy the question, in a sense, can
hardly arise-the legislature "can do no wrong.")
The book, of substantial size, but largely narrowed in scope to the matter
of administrative adjudication, permits and in fact contains an intensive and
thoughtful consideration of the many and important matters which bear on
the working in adjudicative matters of the adminisrative tribunal. The book
is, therefore, a valuable supplement to other works on administrative law
which give less detailed consideration to the matter of adjudication, as well
as a major work in its own right.
It is comparatively, if not totally, unimportant that English agencies, foreign to us, are considered in Robson's book. To those interested in understanding the nature of the adjudicative function in government; the many
different kinds of occasions calling for the exercise of adjudicative power; the
many different kinds of officials other than judges who may be called upon
to exercise such power; the advantages and disadvantages of using one kind
or another; the practical considerations such as those relating to speed,
economy, and efficiency, in getting the adjudicative chore done; the problems of reconciling the claims to proper safeguarding of both public and

REVIEWS

private interests in the often difficult and intricate matters calling for exercise
of adjudicative power;-to those interested in such matters (as distinguished
from the workings of particular agencies), it is important that they realize
that these problems are not merely local or national. Transport regulation,
health measures administration, trade regulation, education, and many other
subjects, as they bear on such matters, are as well studied when the agencies
are English ministries as when they are American commissions.
The American reader might, however, skip certain chapters without too
great loss of an opportunity to explore fundamentals. But the following
chapters should not be missed: Chapter 1 gets to the heart of the basic
problem of what adjudicative power is. Montesquieu and separation of
powers notwithstanding, Robson demonstrates that there is no such thing
as a "divine right" of powers to be separated; that administrative and judicial
powers are often neither separated nor separable; that adjudication is not
exclusively a "judicial"-that is, a court-matter, but that on the contrary it
is equally, and in numerous and important concerns, an administrative matter.
Not all adjudicative power is a monopoly of the "judiciary".
Chapter 2, entitled "Justice in the Courts," is in fact broader in scope than
its title. It is largely a comparative study of the working of both kinds of
adjudicative tribunals, the administrative and the judicial. Both have good
and both have bad features. The reader should learn that not all judicial
adjudication is perfect, and that not all administrative adjudiciation is inferior
(much less inherently evil), and that the sensible thing to do is to utilize
both in government, each where it serves best, and subject to such controls
as will tend to strengthen its weak points.
Chapter 5, which analyzes the concept of the "judicial" mind, attitude,
manner, and action, is a "must" chapter. Here, psychology as well as law
must be considered. We cannot legislate into an intemperate, biased, ignorant,
slothful, or corrupt official, whether on an administrative or judicial tribunal,
the qualities of judicial-mindedness which he lacks. But good administrators,
no less then good judges, have certain intellectual and moral needs, common
to all good men, namely that they be able to act consistently, objectively,
impartially, predictably, reasonably-and even in some matters at discretionwhen called upon to perform the great social function of dispensing justice
to their fellow men. Able and honorable men, of proper judicial temperament, are available to serve not only the courts but the administrative departments as well. Not even judicial-mindedness is a monopoly of the court
judiciary.
Finally, in Chapter 8, is an evaluation of, particularly, the adjudicative
aspect of the administrative process. As a practical matter, we must, of simple
and demanding necessity, have administrative as well as judicial adjudication;
but this does not condemn us to live under an evil, or even inferior, governmental process. Especially worth considering in this connection is the assertion that there is no sound reason to believe that in Britain the administration
is less independent, or more subject to political influence, than the court
judiciary (page 582). The danger of such interference is dismissed as a
"bogey." Not to be overlooked is the point that as to structure, personnel,
and operations, the administration is controllable by law. Properly used and
controlled, the administrative tribunal is not only a necessary, but also a
reasonably adequate (like the courts) instrument for dispensing justice.
Passing from the matter of private justice in individual cases, to the even
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more grave matter of preservation of liberty under free government, it is
both interesting and reassuring that Robson quotes Pound's view (page 623),
delivered in regard to the American situation but considered by Robson to
be equally applicable in England, that we need not fear for the liberty
provided by the Constitution, in the working of administrative adjudicators.
CHARLES H.

KINNANE*

Cases and Materials on Torts. By YOUNG B. SMITH and WILLIAM L. PROSSER.
Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1952. Pp. xix, 1239. $9.00.
Dean (now Emeritus) Smith and Dean Prosser have made a significant
contribution to the field of torts casebooks and at the same time have enlarged upon the pattern of the "Cases and Materials" type of book. While
topical arrangement is essentially traditional, the outstanding feature of this
work is to be found in the amount and style of the supplementary materials.
Adequate coverage of such a vast field as torts in the time allowed in the
ordinary curriculum requires considerable evaluation and selection of topical
subject matter, as well as emphasis upon the selected material. By economical
treatment of the more stable areas of the subject, the authors have been able
to gear the book to expansion in the area of present day problems arising
in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex social and economic order.
They have limited the number of principal cases to 415, which in their
words "is as many as can adequately be discussed in class." By the inclusion
of some text and a great amount of carefully selected case notes and commentaries, together with case problems and comparisons, considerable material is provided for independent student assimilation. The instructor is thus
allowed more classroom time for the more intricate and subtle concepts and,
for purposes of exposition, is supplied with a wealth of material with which
the student has had an opportunity to familiarize himself before class. This
inclusion of background and supplementary material is in accord with a trend
evidenced by most of the newer books of this type and represents a retreat
from the pure casebook of the past. It differs from many casebooks in that
it is more extensive in scope and is so organized as to permit broad or limited
use of the supplementary material as desired without affecting the coherence
of the topical subject matter.
The selection of cases and commentary notes demonstrates a need for reevaluation of many of the principles heretofore regarded as sound and basic,
since modern technological, scientific and social advancements have minimized
many of the considerations upon which such principles were predicated. This
is particularly brought out in the treatment of (a) emotional and mental injuries as independent wrongs, with related problems of damages and causation,
(b) liability of manufacturers to third persons, and (c) defamation.
Cogently emphasized are the need for care in analyzing an opinion with
regard to the factual problems bef(re the court, and the danger of overgeneralization. An illustration of this is to be found in the section dealing
with unusual or ultrahazardous activities and the doctrine of the precedent
setting case of Rylands v. Fletcher. The interpretation placed upon that decision by some courts and many writers, which may be attributed to generalization, was strictly limited in England in the case of Read v. Lyons & Co., Ltd.,
* Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law.

